Eve: A Reinterpretation of Gen. 2-3

Feminist Interpretations of Genesis. 

 

   

Genesis 2-3, Eve and the story of the Garden of Eden is a highly  controversial example of a creation story that has vast implication for social order. Genesis 2-3, as with the rest of the bible, is a text that has to be interpreted.  Traditional interpretations have been distorted by the patriarchal and misogynistic societies from which they were written in.  These reading have been highly influential towards Christian and secular considerations of women in the western world.  Due to this, feminist scholars have approached the text and attempted re-readings through close attention to narrative and linguistics.  However, as I will demonstrate, feminist readings that fail to re-interpret the theological meaning of Genesis 2-3 as a ‘fall’, or a gaining of ‘wrong knowledge’, will inevitably not be able to escape the necessary patriarchy of the text.  Therefore, I will consider radical re-readings of Genesis 2-3 that regard Genesis to represent an ascent into divine knowledge. 

Genesis 2-3 and the figure of Eve, have been used throughout Christian and Jewish history as a justification for the subordination of women.[1]  Indeed, according to the traditional interpretation, all women are the daughters of Eve, and are therefore responsible for bringing evil and death into this world.  The first premise that is used to justify the ‘natural’ subordination of women is the order of creation: notably, that man was created first and then the woman.  The writer of the pseudo-Pauline text, Timothy states: “I permit no women to teach or to have authority over men; she is to be kept silent.  For Adam was formed first, then Eve.”[2]  This passage clearly relates the religious and secular authority of men.  The superior position of man in both the social and religious hierarchy is supported further from the creation of woman as man’s “helper”: “it is not good that man be alone; I will make a helper fit for him,” states Genesis for the rationale behind the creation of woman.[3]   This statement has been widely interpreted as a guideline for the appropriate relationship between men and women: that is it the woman’s role to serve man.  Paul notes in Corinthians: “Neither was man created for woman, but woman was created for man.”[4] Thus, Genesis 2-3 has established theologically that women is firstly inferior to man, and was further to this, created for servitude. 

The exact type of ‘help’ that woman was to provide man with was a point of deliberation for early Christian interpreters.  Augustine provides an exploration of this problematic term:

in what was she to help him?  She was not to till the earth…and he same could be said of the comfort of another’s presence…consequentially, I do not see what sense the woman was made a helper for the man, if not for the sake of bearing children.[5]

Finally, I would like to consider how traditional interpreters have read the act of eating the fruit of knowing good and evil.  For Christian theologians, this is of central importance, for it is the eating of the fruit by Eve that renders the coming of Christ necessary. The choice of the woman by the serpent is considered in two different, but connected viewpoints: it is perceived to reflect her ‘natural’ weaker nature, or to be an indication of her inclination to rebel against God.  The notion of women as the weaker or more easily deceived of the two sexes in Christian thought can be seen in the writings of John Chrysostom: “while this wild woman he (Satan) employed like some convenient instrument so as to be able to set the bait for his own deception and thus upset the woman first of all, being ever more readily susceptible of deception.”[6]  This notion became deeply embedded into Christian discourse.  Indeed, it can be clearly read in the writings of Martin Luther, some 1100 years later: “Satan’s cleverness is perceived also in this, that he attacks the weak part of the human nature , Eve the woman, not Adam the man.”[7] 

Augustine perceives in the exchange between the woman and the serpent not weakness, but a natural predisposition to move away from God.  Indeed, for Augustine the words of the serpent were not the point of divergence, but rather,  “there…was already in her heart a love of her own independence and a proud presumption of self which through that temptation was destined to be found and cast down!”[8]  In conclusion, it is sumly to consider the (in)famous exegesis of Tertullian.  Here, Tertullian explicitly links the above statements to the female gender as a whole:

And do you not know that you are each an Eve?…you are the devil’s gateway: you are the unsealer of that tree: you  are the first deserter of the divine law: you are she who persuaded him whom the devil was not valiant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily, God’s image man.[9]

These statements are prime examples of classic misogynism that utilised Genesis 2-3 as sacred justification.  While they may seem to be antiquated interpretations, these exegesis’s are still highly influential in both terms of biblical interpretation[10] and Christian considerations of women’s secular and religious positions.[11] 

Feminist studies of the bible attempt re-interpretations through a return to the text, either by focusing on character and narrative, or a closer semantic criticism.  It is possible to distinguish two major trends in feminist criticisms of Genesis 2-3: those that remain within the dominant theological interpretation of the text as a fall or descent, and those that radically break away from this reading.   Despite remaining in the existent theological framework, the first approach generally perceives Eve as the heroine of the text.  These authors recognise in Eve an independent, aggressive actor who is discerning and intelligent.  Of cental focus in these considerations is the approach of the serpent to the woman, clearly due to the traditional use of this segment.  Feminists have considered the choice of the woman by the serpent as a sign of the woman’s superior intelligence.[12]  A consideration of the interaction between the woman and the serpent displays the woman playing an active role in the resistance to the serpent, in contrast to the passive role of the man.  Furthermore, for some, this interaction represents the first instance of theological interpretation.[13]  As Phyllis Trible notes, the woman discourses with the serpent, and then proceeds to consider the physical attributes of the tree.   Rather than accepting the words of the serpent on their own accord, the woman clearly assesses the situation for herself.  She then, in an act independent of her husband, proceeds to eat of the fruit and share it with her husband who accepts her gift without resistance. For Trible and others, this is an example of a woman acting independently, creatively and with a level of prominence over her husband in a patriarchal text. 

However, the predominance of the woman over that of the man is the exact problem of the text for some patriarchal interpreters.  In 1577 a Jewish commentator noted:

And she gave him the apple…Adam, poor thing…did not want to eat of the apple.  So she took a tree branch in her hand and beat him until he also ate of the apple…and because…Adam let his wife beat him.  God…cursed him, for he should not let his wife beat him, but he should have beaten her.[14]

Clearly, the weakness of this approach is that it fails to consider previous patriarchal interpretations that consider Eve’s dominance as a transgression which is rectified by her eternal subordinance.  Furthermore, considering the ‘silence’ of Adam in the exchange with the serpent as evidence of his inferiority is doubly problematic.  Firstly, it assumes a sexist stance: simply reversing a patriarchal interpretation for that of a matriarchal is not an attempt at equality!  Secondly, by emphasising the woman’s dominance and failing to address the silence of the text, allows for the insertion of patriarchal interpretations as demonstrated above.[15]

The semantic approach by feminists who remain within the dominant framework can also be considered problematic.  Phyllis Trible considers the importance of the interpretation of the Hebrew term ‘adham’.  Adham, she contends, is a generic term for human kind, rather than just for man.  The text supports this: as is it to adham that God commands not to eat of the fruit of the tree of good and evil, which is later repeated by the woman.[16]  If adham is taken to mean ‘man’ only, it would be difficult to account for the woman’s knowledge of the command.  Through interpreting adham as humankind, Trible also rejects the notion of woman being created second.  Rather, man and woman are created simultaneously, through a separation of humankind into opposites.[17]  Trible also takes challenge to the traditional interpretations of woman being created as a ‘helper’.  The Hebrew term for ‘helper’ – ‘ezer’, maintains Trible does not necessarily denote inferiority or servitude, and indeed that God is described as a helper throughout the Old Testament.[18]  Jean Higgins supports this interpretation, consider the term ‘helper’ to denote superior strength: “a helper must be the stronger one, in no way needing help.”[19] 

However, what type of ‘helper’ was the woman meant to be?  Critics of Trible have pointed out that there was no task required of the woman to help the man in, beside that of procreation.[20]  In further support of this, the ‘punishments’ handed down to the man and woman can be seen to be in relation to their occupational purpose.  The man shall return to the ground, while the woman shall return to the man for the purpose of procreation.  Thus, the woman, even if no longer considered as a servant of the man, is still defined by her procreative abilities in a strikingly similar manner to the traditional interpretations.  This connection nullifies Trible’s assertion that adham is a generic term for humankind, rather than just the male species.  Furthermore, these approaches still retain the notion of a fall from divinity or a concept that ‘wrong knowledge’ was gained through the eating of the apple.   This interpretation essentially makes it impossible to remove the patriarchal and misogynistic aspects of the text; if the apple is considered to produce a ‘fall’ from God, it is the woman who had an active role in its consumption.  Clearly, as Deborah Sawyer has noted, if one chooses to remain in the traditional framework and interprets Genesis 2-3 as a fall, the text is beyond redemption for feminist purposes.[21]

As is evidenced above, in terms of a gendered reading, the crux of Genesis 2-3 is the ‘fall’.  However, the situation of the woman in the text is dramatically relativised if the notion of a ‘fall’ is rejected.  Radical interpretations have chosen to consider the placement of man and woman in the garden as a temporary condition; the garden is seen to act as a womb-like incubation for humankind in its infancy.[22]  Mary Korsak demonstrates that this is clearly evidenced in the text.  Firstly, notes Korsak, adham is made prior to the garden, thus the garden is clearly made for adham.  Adham’s creation is to till the soil, however, there is no mention of the need to work the soil in the text.  Thus, we are forced to consider that adham must eventually move out of the garden to perform the occupation for which she was created.  Furthermore, Korsak maintains that this is supported through an “in-out movement that characterises the groundling’s stay in the garden.”[23]  This is demonstrated through the existence of the river, which flows out into other lands, which contain, “pure gold, rare perfumes and precious stones.”[24]  As Korsak aptly notes, the river sequence demonstrates that life is possible outside of
Eden, and indeed, that there are beautiful treasures to be found there!  For Korsak, God originally intended for the man and woman to leave
Eden, after their ‘eyes have been opened’ and they had been given the necessary knowledge to live in the world.[25]  Korsak considers the statement of God in relation to the tree of knowing good and evil to statement of motherly concern, rather than a threat.  According to Korsak, this statement can be read as the mother within God dreading the coming of knowledge which will entail her children leaving her direct influence.

Other radical readings, following Korsak in the notion that placement in
Eden was a temporary location, also reconsider the meaning of the tree.  In modern theological discourse the fruit of the tree results in: “the knowledge of…opposites, judgements and separation…precisely the knowledge that children do not have.”[26]  The author here, lamenting over the painful nature of this knowledge, forgets that the ability to separate into opposites is precisely the skill that God utilises in the creation of the universe in Genesis 1.  Recognising this connection, radical readings have chosen to identify the tree as providing wisdom or Sophia. 

The identification of Sophia is based on a number of different aspects.  Firstly, there is a clear indication that the serpent is imbued with a position of divinity and knowledge.  On a linguistic level, the description of the serpent as “arum” (often translated as ‘cunning’) is in fact used frequently in wisdom literature as ‘prudent’.[27]  Furthermore, in the Ancient Near East, serpents were widely considered to be representative of wisdom.[28]  This is taken into the Christian tradition, as evidenced in Matthew: “Be wise as serpents.”[29]  This can also be seen implicitly in text: the serpent is aware of knowledge in the text that is privy only to God.[30]  Thus, the wider setting of the text provides the serpent with a position of divinity and an association with wisdom.  While modern dominant theological though discredits the wisdom gained through consuming the apple as false and dichotomous, Genesis tells us that this wisdom is clearly divine: “These people now know the difference between right and wrong, just as we do.”[31]

In this reading, the reason for the choice of the woman by the serpent is also considered.  In the Old Testament, wisdom is often personified as a woman.[32]  Indeed God’s agent of Wisdom, Sophia, is a female character.  Many commentators on Genesis 2-3 consider the serpent to be an extension of Eve, rather than an independent character.[33]  Although traditionally, this has resulted in the serpent’s cunning being the woman’s cunning, for such radical interpreters this results in the woman becoming a divine agent of God.[34]  Judith McKinlay finds in Genesis evidence that wisdom, through the woman, was clearly a gift from God.  Mckinlay considers the man’s charge that it was God who gave him the woman who gave him the fruit. This, for McKinlay relates, “the gift of the God given woman and the Godly fruit.”[35]   Furthermore, McKinlay considers that God in Genesis2-3 is perhaps playing the role of the divine trickster and that the eating of the fruit was always the divine intention.  Therefore, God placed the woman in
Eden to play the role of giving Wisdom to the man. 

McKinlay’s placement of woman as the divine agent, Sophia is gratifying: it places woman within the text positively without allowing for a misogynistic interpretation.  Furthermore, it is advanced in that it also allows for an equal validation of man in Genesis 2-3.  If we consider the woman to be representative of Wisdom, due to association and primary activity, what classifies the man in
Eden?  As noted earlier, man does not till the ground within
Eden, rather his primary activity is to name through words.  It is perhaps convenient that in Christian and Jewish thought, God’s prime agents are Wisdom, (Sophia) and Word, (Logos).  Thus as woman deposits Wisdom upon man, man deposits the Word upon woman in preparation to go into the world outside of
Eden. 

The above reading is indeed a radical reading of Genesis 2-3.  It allows for a positive reading of the woman, without positing her above the man.  Furthermore, it allows the earlier feminist interpretations of Genesis 2-3 to be read and have true effect.  That this is necessary is evident: the traditional interpretations of Genesis are clearly patriarchal and misogynistic and must be re-interpreted for women in the Christian tradition to gain equality: religiously and secularly.  However, to perform a gendered re-reading whilst accepting the interpretation of the ‘fall’, prevents any true feminist reading.  Clearly, in order to provide a reading of Genesis 2-3 that presents woman in a positive light, it is necessary to radically reinterpret the theological meaning.  

---

[1] Yee, G. 2003. Poor Banished Children of Eve: Women and evil in the Hebrew Bible. Fortress Press,
Minneapolis.  p.59; Sawyer, D. 1992. “Resurrecting Eve? Feminist Critique of the Garden of Eden” in ed. Paul Morriss and Deborah Sawyer A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of
Eden. pp. 273-289. Sheffield Academic
Press, England. p. 274; Korsak, M. 1994. “Eve: Malignant or Maligned?” Cross Currents. Vol. 44. no. 4. pp. 453-463. p. 453; Cornell, M. 2005. “Mother of all the Living: Reinterpretations of Eve in Contemporary Literature” Cross Currents. Vol. 54. no. 4. pp. 91-103. p. 91. 

[2] 1 Tim. 2:11-14; for a lengthy consideration of Eve in Christian though t see Norris, P. 1998. The Story of Eve. Picador,
London.

[3] Gen. 2:18

[4] 1. Cor. 11:7-9. 

[5] Augustine. 1999. “The Literal Meaning of Genesis” in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. pp. 148-154.Indiana
University Press, Indinanpolis.  p. 150.

[6] Chrysostom, J.1999. “Homilies on Genesis” in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. pp. 142-146.
Indiana
University Press,
Indianapolis. p. 144

[7] Luther, M. 1999. “Letters on Genesis” in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. pp267-274.
Indiana
University Press,
Indianapolis. P. 270

[8] Augustine. “The Literal Meaning”  p. 151

[9] Tertullian. 1999. “On the Apparel of Women” in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. Pp. 132-133.
Indiana
University Press,
Indianapolis. p. 132

[10] See 1999. “Twentieth-Century
Readings: The Debates Continue” in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. Ppp. 371-387. 
Indiana
University Press,
Indianapolis. 

[11] See Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood.1999. “The
Danvers Statement” in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. pp. 388-390.
Indiana
University Press,
Indianapolis.

[12] Trible, P.1999. “Eve and Adam: Genesis 2-3 Reread” in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. pp. 388-390.
Indiana
University Press,
Indianapolis  p. 434.  Trible’s interpretation is highly influential and used throughout feminist interpretations of Genesis.  For example see: Korsak. “Eve” p. 254; Higgins, J. 1978. “Anastasious Sinaita and the Superiority of Woman.” Journal of Biblical Literature vol. 97. no. 2. pp. 253-257. p. 253; Kimelman, R. 1998. “The Seduction of Eve and Feminist
Readings of the Garden of Eden” Women in Judaism. vol. 6. pp. 1-39. pp. 5-6

[13] Trible, “Eve and Adam” p. 434

[14] Solnik, R.B.A.1999. “The Woman’s Book of Commandments”  in ed. Kirsten E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Zieglar. Eve and Adam, Jewish Christian and Muslim
Reading of Genesis. p 167.
Indiana
University Press,
Indianapolis. p. 167

[15] Furthermore, the silence of Adam in Genesis and his passive acceptance of the apple is often interpreted as being a result of his seduction by Eve. 

[16] Bal, M. 2001. “Sexuality, Sin and Sorrow: The Emergence of the Female Character” in ed. Elizabeth A. Castelli and Rosmund C. Rodman. Women, Gender, Religion: A Reader.  pp. 149-167.
Palgrave, New York. p. 157

[17] Mirroring the act of creation in Genesis 1 which involves the separation of the elements of the universe into opposites.  Trible. “Eve and Adam” p. 433; Bal. “Sexuality” pp. 156-159.

[18] Trible p. 432

[19] Higgins, J. “Anastasius” p. 255

[20]
Gardner, A. 1982. “Genesis 2: 4b-3: A Mythological Paradigm of Sexual Equality or of the Religion History of Pre-exilic
Israel?” Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. 43. pp. 1-18.; see Saywer. “Resurrecting Eve” pp. 286-287.

[21] Sawyer. “Resurrecting Eve” pp. 286-287. 

[22] Cunningham, A. 1992. “Type and Archetype in the
Eden Story” in ed. Paul Morriss and Deborah Sawyer. A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of
Eden. pp. 291-310.  Sheffield Academic
Press, England.  pp. 291-292

[23] Korsak, M. 1998. “A Fresh Look at the Garden of Eden” Semeia vol. 81. pp. 131-145.  p. 138

[24] Gen. 2:12

[25] The opening of eyes is an important notion that frequents wisdom literature and separates the wise from the ignorant, who are like children.  Bal. “Sexuality” p. 165. 

[26] Mitchell, S. 1996. “Temptation” in ed. Bill Moyers.. Genesis – a  Living Conversation pp. 40-69.
Doubleday, New York. p. 54

[27] Sawyer. “Resurrecting Eve”  p. 68

[28] They are also often connected with female divinities and women.

[29] Matt 10:16.  Sawyer. p. 67

[30] Carmichael, C. 1992. “The
Paradise Myth: Interpreting Without Jewish and Christian Spectacles” in ed Paul Morriss and Deborah Sawyer. A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of
Eden. pp. 47-64.
Sheffield Academic Press.  p. 49

[31] Gen. 3:22.

[32]
Carmichael. “The
Paradise Myth” p. 51

[33] Kimelman. “The Seduction” p. 6

[34] McKinlay, J. 1999. “To Eat or not to Eat: Where is the Wisdom in this Choice?” Semeia. vol. 86 pp. 73-86. p. 77

[35] McKinlay.  “To Eat” pp. 76-77.

Jihad Jack

  I’m unaware of the extent of coverage on Australia’s “Jihad Jack” inthe US.  It’s a long and pretty sad story, and pretty damn scary.  The man was imprisoned without trial (ringing any bells) for over 3 months, convicted on the basis of confessions made under torture by Pakistan Secret Police, CIA and Australian SAS and the released after said confession was deemed inadmissable.  Now, after nullifying his convictions, “Jihad Jack” has been placed under Australia’s first control order which places him on a curfrew and get this: bans him from contacting Osama Bin Laden and dead Iraq terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  

So Jack – no talkies with Uncle Laden – and keep away from anyform of necromancy, right!  That includes novelty ouija boards.  Seriously, banning the man from contacting Laden – one would think if that was a possibility, or more correctly within his capabilities, Jackie boy would have been screaming down the line to get some kind of deal for giving up the world’s most wanted man. 

Review: Authoritarian or Authority-Minded

Owen, Dennis; Wald, Kenneth; Hill, Samuel. 1991. “Authoritarian or Authority-Minded? The Cognitive Commitments of Fundamentalists and the Christian Right” Religion and American Culture. vol. 1 no. 1. pp. 73-100

Dennis Own, Kenneth Wald and Samuel Hill are, in this article, addressing the issue of authority in fundamentalists and the Christian right, in the United States of America. The authors posit that the term, “authority-mindedness” should be used in place of “authoritarianism”. This is because, they state, the term “authority-mindedness” provides a distinction between an ideological commitment and a personality trait; of which the term is often used to describe fundamentalists and holds a rather degenerative position. (1) This places the authors of this article in context with the recent trend of re-evaluating fundamentalisms, especially at the psychological level.(2) “Authority-minded” represents a world view that, “self consciously values authority.”(3) The authors maintain that the Christian fundamentalists under their study are concerned with the maintenance of a reliable order, rather than the domination of others.

That, “authority-mindedness” is a more appropriate term is defended by the authors by the results of a quantitative survey of Christian Fundamentalists in which the participants tested low on “authoritarianism.” However, this is not convincing: the use of a quantitative survey can often produce leading results and furthermore, the authors have failed to demonstrate their findings in relation to other research on authoritarianism in the field.(4) Indeed, it could be said that the above authors are steeped in apologetics. For example the following statement is deeply apologetic:

Fundamentalists are defending God’s way, not their own. The dogmatisism, rigidity, and authority-mindedness displayed are not of their own making and therefore not a wilful self-assertion.(5)

While the authors may in some sense be congratulated for their sympathetic approach, the above statement removes any sense of responsibility. Indeed, this removes the recognition that the individual herself must accept a given interpretation, and accept to become the vassal of the authority maker. When the fundamentalist’s states that it is, “God’s way or the highway,” they are in fact stating, “it is my interpretation of God’s way or the highway.” This lack of critical awareness is inherent in this article. For another example, while the authors admit that the family and household are part of the, “reliable order,” of the fundamentalist, and that this order is often patriarchal, they still maintain that fundamentalists are not interested in dominating others. Here, the authors fail to question whether or not the “reliable order” does in fact involve the domination of others; which a patriarchal system inevitably does. In conclusion, the authors of this article have attempted a sympathetic departure from previous research into fundamentalism which defined it degenerately. However, it is clear that apologetics have deeply marred their approach, which lacks in critical application.

1. Owen, D; Wald, K; Hill, S. 1991. “Authoritarian or Authority-Mindedness? The Cognitive of Fundamentalists and The Christian Right” Religion and American Culture. vol. 1 no. 1. pp. 73-100. pp. 75-76

2. For other articles that are also attempting such a re-evaluation see Savage, S. 2002. “A Psychology of Fundamentalism: The Search for Inner Failings” in ed. Martyn Percy and Ian Jones. Fundamentalism: Church and Society. p. 25. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge,
London; Strozier, Charles. 1994. “Introduction” in Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in America. pp. 1-24. Beacon Press,
Boston.

3. Owen. “Authoritarian” p. 76

4. See: Laythe, B; Finkel, D; Bringle, R; Kirkpatrick, L. 2002. “Religious Fundamentalism as a Predictor of Prejudice” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. vol. 41 no. 4. pp. 623-635. Although this was obviously written long after the article in question above, it provides a detailed bibliography of research on authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism that is contemporaneous with said article.

5. Owen. “Authoritarian” p. 86

On The Fluff – ver 1.1

Recently, inaeth (see links) and I had a discussion about neo-paganism and literature.  I was quite suprised to end up discussing rare occult authors with someone who’s blog I came across due to its features on Christian Fundamentalism.  Althouh no insult to inaeth, and not meaning to stipulate on his religiosity (he could  very well be an occultist – I should ask), it occured to me that I have never, in my entire eight months in the online pagan community, seen Robert Anton Wilson or Austin O’Spare discussed.  It’s pretty bloody tragic when lay intellects have a greater knowledge of occult books than the damn occult community.  You see, the problem here is most certainly FLUFF. Now, the term ‘fluff’ or ‘fluffy’ is banded about, willy nilly in the pagan community.  It’s the ultimate insult; the ultimate conversation stopper.  Fluff is something so called ’serious’ pagans (pagans who believe they are instrinsic practicers of the religion – not pagan who sit on leather arm chairs and smoke tobacco pipes over whisky) abhore and are quick to scream at anyone who professes any kind of naievity.  Yet, these self-same ’serious pagans’, have a rather limited library of knowlegde.  Or perhaps, they have little interest in discussing texts that are not part of their general repetoir.  You see, the fluff-criers, have an extreme dislike of any occultic text that ventures into the realm of drug induced ASC.  I am beginning to wonder whether or not fluff-crying is a shadow or mirroring phenomenon of fluff itself.

Psychology of Apocalyptic Fundamentalism Review

Strozier, Charles. 1994. ?Introduction? in Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in
America. pp. 1-24. Beacon Press,
Boston.

 

Charles Strozier has provided an interesting introduction to the topic of the psychology of apocalypticism, a phenomena which is essential to the study of fundamentalism.  In this introduction to his book length study of apocalypticism, Strozier outlines his definition of apocalypticism, the religious groups of which he interacted, (namely Pentecostal, Baptist and conservative Evangelical) and his method of study. 

 

Strozier’s psychological study of apocalyptic fundamentalism clearly departs from traditional approaches to such phenomena, which are motivated by the attempt to locate fundamentalist thought within the areas deep psychological problems.(1)  Rather Strozier considers apocalypticism as one form of response to the collective instability of an age which experiences ultimate threats to its existence.(2)  For Strozier, apocalyptic thought is common among the politically, socio-economically and emotionally disenfranchised and is, “necessarily rooted in private dramas of great significance and pain.”(3)  Indeed, implicit in Strozier?s outline of the causes and definition of apocalyptic fundamentalism is real or imagined disenfranchisement.  In his summary of apocalypticism, Strozier not only utilised such language, but gave special reference to African Americans.(4)  While only implicit, Strozier has failed to discuss the motivation of those fundamentalists who are not disenfranchised; who rather, are in a position a political and socio-economic power, despite the fact that these individuals are one of his primary groups of study.   Further, Strozier does not consider the important place of politics within apocalyptic fundamentalism.(5)  However, Strozier’s outline still provides a thought-provoking introduction to the study of apocalypticism.  Despite his leanings towards apologeticism, it is clear that this approach is far preferable than those that define such phenomenon degenerately.(6)

 

1. Savage, S. 2002. “A Psychology of Fundamentalism: The Search for Inner Failings” in ed. Martyn Percy and Ian Jones. Fundamentalism: Church and Society. p. 25. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge,
London.  p. 25.

 

2.  Strozier, C. 1994. Apocalypse: On The Psychology of Fundamentalism in
America. Beacon Press,
London. p. 3.

 

3. Strozier. Apocalypse. pp. 2-3

 

4. Strozier. Apocalypse. p. 2

 

5. For an outline of the political right and apocalyptic fundamentalism see Urban, H. 2006. “
America, Left Behind. Bush, the Neoconservatives and Christian Evangelical Fiction” Journal of Religion and Society. vol. 8. http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2006/2006-2.html  accessed on 21/8/06 at 12:00pm. 

 

6.  I use the term, “apologetic” here lightly and in reference to the tendency of scholars of new religious movements to take either an ?apologetic? or highly critical stance towards their subject matter.  These approaches are clearly informed by both each other, and the wider phenomenon of cult scares

The Problem of Evil

The Problem of Moral Evil: A Consideration of the Free Will Defence and Marilyn McCord Adams’ Theodicy 

That the problem of evil poses a significant challenge to theism is illustrated by the long history of the philosophic and theologic debate surrounding this matter.  Due to its vast and complex history, in this essay I have chosen to consider two theistic approaches to the problem of moral evil: the free will defence and the theodicy of Marilyn McCord Adams.  A study of the free will defence requires that one consider the logical problem of evil.  This allows for an appropriate background to evaluate the free will defence, and a number of significant debates surrounding it. 
Adams theodicy provides a significant contrast to the free will defence: rather than a consideration of why God allows evils, but how God can defeat evil in the context of an individual’s life. 
Adams’ theodicy is far more of a theological exercise, than a philosophical one.  Thus, a review of her work must be carried out with more attention to its conceptual detail.  The purpose of this essay is to consider two prominent theistic debates, and their impact of the problem of evil.

The problem of evil has been approached contemporaneously by some as a logical problem.  Central to this argument is the contribution of J. L. Mackie.  For Mackie, theistic belief is, “positively irrational”, due to the problems involved in reconciling the following essential statements of theistic belief:

            a)  God is omnipotent and omniscient

            b)  God is omni-benevolent

            c)  Evil exists in the world.[1]

As Mackie as others after him have notes, the inconsistency between these three statements soon becomes apparent if one considers a and b to conclude that such a being would prevent c.[2]  Only two of any of the above statements  may be true at any one time, necessarily negating the other.  However, theistic belief requires the truth of a and b, while it cannot reject the clear evidence of c. 

A theistic rebuttal to the logical problem of evil that is entertained widely is the free will defence.  This argument is not constricted to modern debates. Indeed, it has been central to a number of Christian considerations of the problem of evil, it clearly evidenced in both the Augustinian and Ireanean theodicies.[3]  In the contemporary debate, arguments are focused upon the approach of Alvin Platinga.  Platinga’s approach follows a similar format to that of other theistic rebuttals to the logical problem of evil.  It considers the possibility of a b and c being true through the addition of a fourth statement, d: that God created agents who are significantly free to choose and act according to their own free will.  Thus, the free will defence attempts to maintain the truth of a and b, whilst entailing c.[4]

Naturally, the notion of free will must be defined and placed in context if it is to provide an appropriate defence of God,  The concept of free will that Platinga has proposed is specifically incompatible with determinism.  In that, if an agent is free, she is able to perform of refrain from a given action: there are “no causal laws or antecedent conditions that determine the outcome of the given situation.”[5]  Platinga stipulates that one must consider the moral dimension of free will.  The agent is able to recognise the moral significance of their action, and is able to perform or refrain from any such action.[6]  Thus, God chose to create free agents who are able to perform actions with the knowledge of their moral significance.  This, according to Platinga, is a situation that is far more valuable than a world without free agents.  However, this also entails the existence of agents who choose to perform morally wrong or evil actions.  God could not have prevented this without also preventing the ability to perform morally good actions.[7]

There have been a number of atheistic objections to the free will defence as proposed by Alvin Platinga.   A predominant objection has been raised by J. L. Mackie.[8]  Mackie posits that God, if she is to be attributed with the traditional concepts of omnipotence, omniscience and omni-benevolence, could have made free agents that always choose good.[9]  According to Mackie: “if there is no logical impossibility in a man’s (sic) freely choosing the good on the one, or on several occasions, there is no logical impossibility in his (sic) freely choosing good on every occasion.”[10]  However, Mackie’s assertion is not as straight forward as he assumes.  Platinga notes Mackie’s attack and considers whether God can maintain the freedom of an agent is she causes the agent to choose rightly.  Freedom is reliant upon the ability to choose or refrain from performing an action: if God ensures than an agent chooses 1, they are not in actuality free to refrain from doing so.[11]  Gods omnipotence is subject to logical limits which requires that she cannot ensure an agent choose 1, whilst maintaining the agents freedom.

James Cain has considered Mackie’s attack seriously.[12]  Cain, I believe significantly points out that Mackie’s objections can indeed be considered to be logical on an epistemic and conceptual level.[13]  However, this is not the case if we are to consider free will and the consequential phenomena of an evil action as a subject of metaphysic enquiry.  Indeed, Cain notes that free will is an occurrence that is central to human activity, and thus has a nature that can be considered: we may draw conclusions about its nature.[14]  According to our current metaphysical understanding of human choice and free will, it is impossible it is impossible for it to be determined.[15]  The point here is that while one may conceptualise of a world like Mackie’s, it is impossible to see how that world would function within the constrictions of ours.

Mackies’ objection also ignores the matter of moral significance in the choice of God creating free agents: if God had created beings who always chose rightly, there would be no moral significance to their actions.  Without the ability to choose an evil action, there is no ability to choose a good action: moral significance is related to consequences of an action, and the freedom to have chosen differently.  To choose to respect another’s wishes becomes significant when one considers the impact of not doing so, and the fact that one was able to not do so.  Therefore, it is clear that Mackie’s notion of God creating right choosing free beings is essentially positing a non-logical being who operates outside the metaphysical nature of our world, and in doing so, robs this world of any moral significance. 

Steven Boër has presented an alternative attack on the free will defence.[16]  Boër rejects the free will defence on the basis that God could have created free agents who were able to choose wrongly, however God would intervene and prevent the consequence of the agents choices through, “coincidental miracles.”[17]  As with Mackie’s approach, Boër’s approach is also problematic. 

Firstly, Boër’s notion of non-consequential evil actions ignores the direct link between action and consequence; without this, there is no moral significance to an action.[18]  Thus, there is little significance to ‘good’ actions either, if good consequences are always ensured.[19] Furthermore, one must question whether Boër’s approach allows for freedom of choice: if attempting to perform an evil action in such a world would be impossible, it is likely that agents would realise this and therefore never attempt to do so.[20]  For example, it is a natural fact that in this world, I cannot breathe through water.  As this is apparent, no one attempts to breathe water. 

Additionally, God must also intervene on choices made by an agent who perceived it to be good, yet had negative consequences that the agent could not foresee.  Further to this, actions that would be considered small or irrelevant evils would gain greater significance in such a world.  To illustrate, the act of feeding a child sweets becomes morally evil in this universe: it causes tooth decay, prevents later hunger, provides the child with no nutritional value, and can lead to obesity, which in turn has numerous health problems.[21]  Boër’s world removes any moral significance to individual actions and in essence, removes free will.  Furthermore, an inconsequential world will ultimately stagnate. 

The free will defence offers a considerable argument for the existence of God in the context of the problem of evil.  However, it is not accepted unanimously.  The debate concerning the problem of evil continues quite vehemently, producing arguments from both sides.  A significant theistic contribution is that of Marilyn McCord Adams. 
Adams focuses on what the problem of ‘horrendous evils’ poses to the Christian tradition.[22] 

Horrendous evils are defined by
Adams as those whose participation in, for both the perpetrator and victim provide one with, “reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could be a great good to one on the whole.”[23] 
Adams ambitiously lists what she believes to be horrendous evils.  Two examples of which include the rape of a woman and the dismemberment of her arms, and the child abuse as described by Iavn Karamazov.[24]  The importance here is that
Adams focus in on the impact (and resolution) of evil upon the individual lives, rather than attempting to provide a global theodicy that ignores individual suffering. 

Adams posits that a theodicy that provides the individual with a means of defeating the evil in their life will focus upon how God is good; rather than why God allowed the evil in the first instance.[25]  This entails integrating participation in horrendous evils into a person’s relationship with the divine.[26] 
Adams provides three ways in which she believes the experience of evils are able to be integrated into the divine relationship.  The first is through a “sympathetic” or “mystical” identification with the passion of Christ.[27]  Secondly,
Adams draws upon the notion of divine gratitude as presented by Julian of Norwich.[28]  Thirdly, one may construe one’s own suffering to be a, “vision into the inner life of God.”[29]  These experiences according to
Adams provide the individual with a defeat of evil in their life:  interaction with God’s goodness provides them with the ability to create meaning to their pain.

Adams theodicy is interesting in the way in which she focuses upon religious concepts within the Christian tradition and rejects wider secular and philosophic notions.  This point is of course a matter for which she could be criticised, however, to do would miss the importance of what she has performed. 
Adams’ theodicy is interested in a theodicy for the religious individual: it concerns itself with the religious belief of the individual (if only a certain population) and with the impact of evil upon them.

This is in stark contrast with other theodicies that struggle with complex and abstract ideas which are of no interest to the religious person.[30]  As Steven Cahn poignantly noted, logical arguments rarely result in a conversion.[31]  Rather Cahn considers belief in God to be related to a personal and infallible experience with of God.[32]  The connection between these two academics points to a recognition that belief in God adnd the challenge of evil is a psychological problem, which as Adams’ and Cahn posit, are resolved for many only through an experience of God.

Adams focus upon Christian beliefs has been considered by some important.  Indeed, as William Placher and Charles Hefling have noted, identification with Christ’s suffering as a clear history within Christianity.[33]  Furthermore,
Adams consideration of the effect of perpetrating evils is a placement that provides a deeper understanding of pain and evil: it recognises that we are indeed all victims and more importantly, rings true to the notion of salvation.[34]  However, some find this recognition disturbing,: Phillip Quinn questions whether
Adams allows Judas’ betrayal to become meaningful – or, Quinn states, “is Judas rightly located at the bottom of Dante’s hell?”[35]

Central to a number of objections to
Adams’ work is her reliance on a psychological recognition of the divine in one’s suffering.  Heffling notes that an identification with Christ in suffering is strictly psychological, it is not “determined” or under one’s control.[36]  Andrew Chignell has also approached work similarly, on the basis of infant suffering.[37] 

Chignell considers that
Adams three modes of integration with the divine relies on a “self-conscious” recognition or identification with the divine that is surely impossible for infants.[38]  However, as Basinger notes, a child may later in life attribute meaning to an evil event, or, celebrate its significance post-mortemly.[39]  Clearly,
Adams theodicy is not free from its detractors. However, perhaps as some have noted, its importance is not in its problematic details, but in the way in which it promotes a shift in focus upon individual belief and suffering.[40]

Evidently, the free will defence and
Adams’ theodicy have incredibly different modes of approaching the problem of evil, despite the fact that they are both attempting to defend theism.  The free will defence is clearly quite a strong argument for the existence of evil in a God created world.  Those who have provided challenges to this approach do so on a largely conceptual basis, however, I have taken that free will must be taken metaphysically.

Furthermore, the approaches of Mackie and Boër are weakened by the inability to consider the importance of moral significance within our world and the free will defence. 
Adams’ theodicy is radically different in its approach to the problem of evil.  Her interest in how evil affects individual life and beliefs is indeed a needed approach.  While her argument is certainly problematic, and may not be concerned with a majority of religious believers, the way in which she approaches the subject is perhaps far more in touch with religious belief and practice.  However, while some may not be affected by logical arguments, it is sure that others are.  In conclusion, it is my belief that these arguments may or may not defeat the problem of evil. It is impossible to state surely which answer one may give, when this problem is truly a matter for the individual believer. 

---

[1] Mackie, J. L. 1990 “Evil and Omnipotence”  in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams ed. The Problem of Evil. p. 25.
Oxford
University Press,
New York. p. 25

[2] Mackie. “Evil” p. 25; Keller, J. 1989. “The Problem of Evil and the Attributes of God” Philosophy of Religion. vol. 26 pp. 155-171. p. 155.

[3] Hick, J.  1997. Evil and the God of Love. Harper Collins,
New York. p. 265. 

[4] Platinga, A. 1990. “God, Evil and the Metaphysics of Freedom” in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams. p. 83.
Oxford
University Press,
New York. p. 84. 

[5] Platinga. “God” p. 84. 

[6] Platinga. “God” p. 84

[7] Platinga. “God” p. 85

[8] It is also raised notoriously by Anthonly Flew.  Mackie. “Evil”; Penelhum, T. 1990. “Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil” in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams ed. The Problem of Evil. p. 69.
Oxford
University Publishing,
New York. p. 69.

[9] Mackie. “Evil” p. 33

[10] Mackie. “Evil” p. 33

[11] Platinga. “God” p. 89

[12] Cain, J.  2004. “Free Will and the Problem of Evil” Religious Studies. vol. 40 pp. 437-456.

[13] Cain “Free” p. 442-445. 

[14] Cain “Free” p. 446

[15] Cain also uses this logic to dismiss
Frankfurt style experiments on the basis that they are metaphysically impossible.  p. 446

[16] Boër, S.  1978. “The Irrelevance of the Free Will Defence” Analysis vol. 38 no. 2 pp. 110-112; A similar argument is proposed by Arthur Fleming. Fleming, A. 1986. “Omnibenevolence and Evil” Ethics. vol. 96 no. 2 pp. 261-281. 

[17] Boër, S. “Irrelevance” p. 111

[18] Layman, S. 1986. “Moral Evil: The Comparative Response” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. vol. 53. pp. 1-23. p. 10-11.

[19] Dilley, F. 1990. “The Free Will Defence and Worlds Without Moral Evil” Philosophy of Religion. vol. 27. pp. 1-15. p. 2

[20] Coughlan, M. 1986. “The Free Will Defence and Natural Evil”  Philosophy of Religion vol. 20 pp. 93-108. p. 100; Dilley. p. 2

[21] Dilley. “Free Will”  p. 3

[22]
Adams, M.  1990. “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God” in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams ed. The Problem of Evil. p. 209.
Oxford
University Press,
New York.  As
Adams is interested in the problem of evil for the Christian addition alone, she operates within Christian ideals whilst rejecting wider secularised concepts.  p. 210

[23]
Adams. “Horrendous” p. 211

[24]
Adams. “Horrendous” p. 211

[25]
Adams. “Horrendous” p. 217

[26]
Adams. “Horrendous” p. 218

[27]
Adams. “Horrendous” p. 219

[28]
Adams. “Horrendous” p. 219

[29]
Adams. “Horrendous” p. 219

[30] Placher, W. 2002. “An Engagement with Marilyn McCord Adams: Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God” Scottish Journal of Theology. vol.55 no. 4. pp. 461-467. p. 461; Cahn, S. 1969. “The Irrelevance to Religion of Philosophic Proofs for the Existence of God” vol. 6. no. 2. pp. 170-173. p. 170

[31] Cahn.“Irrelevance” p. 170

[32] Cahn. “Irrelevance” p. 173

[33] Placher. “Engagement” p. 461; Hefling, C. 1998. “Christ and Evils: Assessing an Aspect of Marilyn McCord Adams’ Theodicy” Anglican Theological Review. vol. 83. no. 4. pp. 869-892. p. 872

[34] McNaulty, M. 2000. “Review: Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God” Theological Studies. vol. 61. no. 4. pp. 772-774. p. 774; Placher. “Engagement” p. 466.  Indeed, many of the acts of Jesus are concerned with the acceptance of individuals on the basis of the personhood, rather on their past actions, on the condition that they renounce these and correct past wrongdoings. 

[35] Quinn, P. 2001. “Review: Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God” The Philosophical Review. vol. 110. no. 3. pp. 476-479. p. 477

[36] Hefling. “Problem” p. 872

[37] Chignell, A. 1998. “The Problem of Infant Suffering” Religious Studies. vol. 34. pp. 205-217.

[38] Chignell. “Infant” p. 208-211. 

[39] Basinger, D. 1999. “Infant Suffering: A Response to Chignell” Religious Studies. vol. 35. pp. 363-369. p. 366

[40] 2003. Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. third edition. ed. M. Peterson,
W. Hasker, B. Reicherbach, D. Basinger.
Oxford
University Press,
New York. p.149

Critique of two articles on The Holocaust

“Is it proper to commemorate the extermination of Gypsies, Romani, homosexuals and the mentally retarded as part of the Holocaust?”

 

 

 

 

 

Milton, S. 1991. “Gypsies and The Holocaust” The History Teacher. vol. 24 no. 4. pp. 375-387.  Via JSTOR: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2745%28199108%2924%3A4%3C375%3AGATH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0  accessed on 15/8/06 at 12:15pm.

 

Bauer, Y. & Milton, S. 1992. “Correspondence: Gypsies and The Holocaust” The History Teacher. vol. 25 no. 4. pp. 513-525. Via JSTOR: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2745%28199208%2925%3A4%3C513%3AC%22ATH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K  accessed on 15/8/06 at 12: 40pm.   

 

 

 

 

 

 

The following two articles provide a classic example of the tension that exists within current historiography of the Holocaust.  Both seek to define the Holocaust upon different criteria, of which ultimately devalues different groups that experienced Nazi persecution. 

Sybil Milton’s, “Gypsies and the Holocaust” details the history of the Gypsies under the Nazi movement.  Milton’s article is a convincing argument for the inclusion of the Gypsies and as a by-product, the handicapped, as victims of the Holocaust.  Milton provides a detailed history of the Nazi treatment of the Gypsies, from their placement in Zigeunerlager (special interment camps for Gypsies) prior to 1939, to their biological registration, relocation, incarceration in concentration camps and eventual massacre.

 

 Milton’s article lists reasons for the concentration on Judeocide within the Holocaust literature, and reformulates the categorisation of the ‘Holocaust’.  For Milton, the prime consideration on the fate of the Jews in Nazi Germany in current historiography is related to a number of factors.  Two of these are the larger number of primary government documents relating to Jewish treatment, and the greater production of Jewish memoir literature.  Milton also considers the political motivation of the German people in concentrating solely on Judeocide: “if one considers the fate of the Gypsies and the handicapped, rather than just the Jews, one must begin to consider pre-1939 occurrences carried out by “ordinary” German bureaucrats, scientists and policemen.”[1] 

 

Milton challenges the dominant conception of the ‘Holocaust’ on the basis that it, “posits a qualitative difference between the murder of the Jews and that of the Gypsies and the handicapped without providing any convincing documentary evidence.”[2]  For Milton, the Holocaust constitutes the mass murder of the Jews, the Gypsies and the handicapped in the process of the Nazi conquest to create a biologically homogenous race.  Milton’s reformulation is significant on two points.  This definition of the Holocaust validates and recognises the experiences of the Gypsies and the handicapped under the Nazi regime.  Furthermore, it also places the Holocaust within the context of the Nazi’s attempt to create a pure “Aryan” race; this produces a level of comprehensibility in what is largely considered an incomprehensible subject.

 

Yehuda Bauer represents a prominent advocate of the ‘unique’ definition of the Holocaust: the Holocaust for Bauer is solely the mass murder of the Jews by the Nazis.  In, “Correspondence: Gypsies and The Holocaust” Bauer provides a critique of the above article by Milton.  Initially, Bauer notes that there is insufficient scholarship on the relation between the treatment of the Jews and the Gypsies by the Nazi’s, and that, “one must reserve judgement,” on the matter.[3]  However, it is clear that Bauer has failed to meet his own recommendations.  While Bauer states that the treatment of the Gypsies by the Nazi’s is both, “poignant,” and “horrible,” he is adamant that they and the handicapped are not to be considered victims of the Holocaust.  Bauer’s primary basis for this judgement is that, in contrast to the Jews, not all Gypsies were targeted for extermination.  Rather, contends Bauer, the Gypsies were a mere, “irritant” to the Nazi’s: they were, “no ideological problem or threat.”[4]  Bauer seemingly ignores much of the primary evidence that Milton provides in her aforementioned article, and states that, “the majority [of Gypsies] were left alone.”[5]  This statement perhaps relies on the smaller total number of deaths of the Gypsies, however, fails to consider, as Milton points out, that a similar percentage of the Gypsy and Jewish population were killed under the Nazi regime.[6]  Bauer’s article’s weaknesses reflect the strengths of Milton’s article: his contention that the Holocaust is a solely Jewish phenomenon devalues the experience of the Gypsy and handicapped populations.  Furthermore, such a definition of the Holocaust prevents an understanding of this event in its context of wider Nazi racial policy.  In essence, Bauer is attempting to maintain the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust. 

 

Milton’s defence of her previous article in “Correspondence: Gypsies and The Holocaust” is largely similar.  However, for the purpose of my essay, a statement of Milton’s is significant.  Milton states that the murder of the Gypsies and the handicapped should be considered to be a part of the Holocaust as they were targeted by the Nazi’s on the basis of race.[7]  For Milton, this differentiates the Jews, Gypsies and handicapped from other victims of the Nazi’s including, “political opponents, members of the resistance and elites of conquered nations,” and more significantly, from, “Poles, Czechs and Serbs.”[8]  In her efforts to give validation and recognition to the experiences of Gypsies and the handicapped, Milton, as with Bauer, denigrates the experiences of other victims of the Nazi’s.  In her defence, Milton makes such a definition on available documentary evidence.  As she notes, 93.5% of the Gypsies incarcerated in Auschwitz died: “this figure hardly applies to Poles, Czechs or Serbs.”[9]  (Notably, Milton does not mention the other group under study in this essay, homosexuals.) 

 

However, Milton has fallen into the ethical trap of Holocaust studies: any definition that excludes necessarily devalues certain groups by exclusion; however, all-encompassing inclusion is also in danger of devaluing groups which were persecuted with more intensity than others. Indeed, the study of the Holocaust is a deeply ethical subject.  As Herman Von Ver Dunk has noted, Holocaust studies have a commemorative role: “it serves to strengthen the bonds of solidarity among victims and their descendants.”[10]  Indeed, it can be said that the term, “Holocaust”, can become central to the identity to the various groups who were victims of Nazi persecution.  Thus, in conclusion, I have made it clear that I consider both Bauer’s and Milton’s definition of the Holocaust to be problematic; however, it would seem that any definition of the Holocaust will be problematic.

---

[1] Milton, S. 1991. “Gypsies and The Holocaust” The History Teacher. vol. 24 no. 4. pp. 375-387. p. 378

[2] Milton. “Gypsies” p. 375

[3] Bauer, Y. & Milton, S. 1992. “Correspondence: Gypsies and The Holocaust” The History Teacher. vol. 25 no. 4. pp. 513-525. p. 513

[4] Bauer. “Correspondence” p. 513-514

[5] Bauer. “Correspondence” p. 515

[6] Milton. “Gypsies” p. 377

[7] Milton. “Correspondence” p. 516

[8] Milton. “Correspondence” pp. 516-518. 

[9] Milton. “Correspondence” p. 518

[10] Dunk, H.  2002. “The Holocaust: Remembrance and Education” European Review. vol. 10 no. 1. pp. 53-61. pp. 61-62

Science and religion: philosophy

Gould, S. 2001. “Two Separate Domains” in ed. Michael Peterson. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. p. 499 Oxford University Press, New York.

 

Dawkins, R. 2001. “Science Discredits Religion” in ed. Michael Peterson. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. p. 509. Oxford University Press, New York.

 

Murphy, N. 2001. “Theology and Scientific Methodology” in ed. Michael Peterson. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. p. 513. Oxford University Press, New York.

 

 

The above three articles represent three different, even opposing viewpoints on the philosophical relationship between science and religion.  Stephen Gould and Richard Dawkins present opposing opinions.  For Gould religion and science should not in fact conflict as the two operate over separate domains: moral meaning in contrast to empirical theory: “what is the universe made of.” (1)  However, Gould recognises that, “many of our deepest questions call upon aspects of both magistri for different parts of a full answer.” (2)  Dawkins’ article is written in direct disagreement with Gould’s.  For Dawkins, science in fact directly discredits those religious claims that he believes do make claims that are concerned with, “what the universe is made of,” or, are reliant upon the way in which the universe is.  Nancy Murphy presents a complete alternate viewpoint that argues for the understanding of religion and science through a different epistemical viewpoint.  For Murphy, religion and science can be viewed to have the same processes at the basis of their knowledge.  Murphy considers that the phenomena of religious experience can be studied scientifically.  It is her argument that an apologist needs to demonstrate that, “non-theistic programmes…cannot do as good a job in accounting for religious experience as do theological programmes.” (3)

 

These three viewpoints can be clearly seen in the efforts of the current cosmic design argument.  Indeed, the current endeavour can be seen to be largely driven by Murphy’s challenge to demonstrate that a theistic universe explains the existence of the universe far better than that of a non-theistic universe.  Further, this debate has produced many arguments that attempt to demonstrate Gould’s stand that the two domains should not infiltrate into the other. (4)  This debate has also drawn much attention from those who follows Dawkins opinion and perceive the debate to demonstrate the non-existence  of a theistic belief, or as N. Manson  has noted, consider it to demonstrate that such a deity would not hold the traditional theistic attributes. (5)  Indeed, it is clear that all three viewpoints are represented.  However, each argument bounds off the other for its weaknesses and its strengths. 

 

 

1. Gould, S. 2001. “Two Separate Domains” in ed. Michael Peterson. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. p. 499 Oxford University Press, New York. p. 502
2. Gould. “Two Separate” p. 503

 

3.  Murphy, N. 2001. “Theology and Scientific Methodology” in ed. Michael Peterson. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. p. 513. Oxford University Press, New York. p. 522

 

1. See Fulmer, G. 2001. “A Fatal Flaw in the Anthropic Principle Design Argument” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. vol. 49. pp. 101-110.

 

5. See Manson, N. 2000. “Anthropocentricism and the Design Argument” Religious Studies. vol. 36. pp. 163-176.

Fundamentalism

Percy, Martyn. 1996 Words, Wonders and Power: Understanding Contemporary Christian Fundamentalism. S.P.C.K, London.

 

O’Callaghan, Michael.  2000.  Global Vision: Science and the Sacred: On Fundamentalism.  http://www.global-vision.org/sacred/fundamentalism.html  accessed on 6/8/06 at 12:15pm.

 

 

The above pieces provide an outline of the phenomenon of fundamentalism.  Martyn Percy, in his study of Christian fundamentalism details an essential and basic history of the term fundamentalism: its origins in the Fundamental tenants to its use as a widely applied designate of particular forms of religiosity.  Percy emphasises the “relational” aspect of fundamentalism: that fundamentalism can be largely described as a reaction against the ambiguous variety of the modern world.  For Percy, and others, fundamentalism denotes an anti-modern struggle to return to a previous, simplified order.(1)  Percy’s description of fundamentalism is concerned with what Christian fundamentalism is, rather than how it has developed, or the ambiguities of the term itself. 

 

Michael O’Callaghan’s essay concerns itself with the wider phenomenon of fundamentalism in the current global world.  For O’Callaghan, fundamentalism denotes an authoritarian, exclusive mindset that is not reserved to the modern era.  O’Callaghan, in contrast to Percy, provides an explanation for the development and rise of fundamentalism.  O’Callaghan recognises that fundamentalism is often a product of the individual or community being caught in a relationship with a larger community, that in turn marginalizes and pressures the former into a certain type of behaviour.  Rather than a movement, fundamentalism is a religious tendency: “a hazard of homo religious.”(2) While O’Callaghan outlines that fundamentalism is often a product of poor socio-economic conditions, his definition allows for the consideration of evangelical movements in Latin America, along the upper class religious right in America; or the workings of certain left-wing psychedelic circles.  The tension between the approaches of Percy and O’Callaghan outlines a dilemma in academic study of fundamentalism; the dialectic between movement and mindset.  While Percy’s definition is obviously refined due to the nature of his text, and also that ‘fundamentalism’ does indeed denote a particular movement, it is also clear that it has also come to denote a form of religiosity, rather than a religion. 

       

 

 

1. Lechner, F. Encyclopedia of Religion and Society: Fundamentalism. http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/fundamentals.htm accessed on 6/8/06 at 1:00pm

 

2.  Cameron, Peter. 1995. Fundamentalism and Freedom. Doubleday, New York. pp. 5-6; p. 9